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Abstract
Reichenbach’s early solution to the scientific problem of how abstract mathemati-
cal representations can successfully express real phenomena is rooted in his view 
of coordination. In this paper, I claim that a Reichenbach-inspired, ‘layered’ view 
of coordination provides us with an effective tool to systematically analyse some 
epistemic and conceptual intricacies resulting from a widespread theorising strategy 
in evolutionary biology, recently discussed by Okasha (2018) as ‘endogenization’. 
First, I argue that endogenization is a form of extension of natural selection theory 
that comprises three stages: quasi-axiomatisation, functional extension, and seman-
tic extension. Then, I argue that the functional extension of one core principle of 
natural selection theory, namely, the principle of heritability, requires the seman-
tic extension of the concept of inheritance. This is because the semantic extension 
of ‘inheritance’ is necessary to establish a novel form of coordination between the 
principle of heritability and the extended domain of phenomena that it is supposed 
to represent. Finally, I suggest that—despite the current lack of consensus on the 
right semantic extension of ‘inheritance’—we can fruitfully understand the recon-
ceptualization of ‘inheritance’ provided by niche construction theorists as the result 
of a novel form of coordination.
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Hans Reichenbach’s early view of coordination and its neo-Kantian features have 
been an increasingly popular topic of academic research, both with respect to its 
historical relevance (De Boer, 2011; Eberhardt, 2011; Friedman, 1994; Holland, 
1992; Klein, 2003; Padovani, 2011), and as a source of inspiration for systematic 
theoretical elaboration (Friedman, 2001; Ryckman, 2005; van Fraassen, 2008). 
According to Reichenbach (1920/1965), certain principles relate the conceptual part 
of our physical theories with empirical reality since they coordinate the mathemati-
cal structures and the theoretical terms by which we express our theories with their 
physical correlates. However, as it has been recently emphasised (Padovani, 2015a, 
b, 2017), Reichenbach’s early view of coordination does not simply boil down to a 
one-to-one mapping relationship between theory and phenomena established from 
‘top-down’ by means of certain abstract principles. This insight has prompted novel 
developments inspired by Reichenbach’s own view, with the aim of providing an 
understanding of coordination that goes beyond the assumption of only two epis-
temic levels of analysis—the one of theory and the one of phenomena—and that 
may be applied to scientific inquiries beyond the domain of physics (Luchetti, 2018).
On similar lines, in this paper I will argue that a liberalised understanding of 
coordination, yet inspired by Reichenbach’s own view, provides us with a system-
atic approach to analyse some conceptual and epistemic consequences of a wide-
spread theorising strategy in evolutionary biology, that has recently been discussed 
by Okasha (2018) under the name of ‘endogenization’. This strategy is based on the 
attempt of evolutionary biologists to explain in terms of natural selection theory 
some variables that, at an earlier stage of theorising, constituted the background pre-
suppositions of natural selection theory itself. On the one hand, I will show that the 
tools of coordination analysis, if properly adapted, can enhance our understanding 
of conceptual change also in the life sciences. On the other, I will develop Oka-
sha’s own characterisation of endogenization in two ways. First, I will identify three 
stages of the process of endogenization: quasi-axiomatisation, functional extension, 
and semantic extension. Second, I will show that the functional extension of the core 
abstract principles of natural selection theory has important consequences on the 
meaning of certain concepts of the theory, thus impacting the coordination of these 
principles with the phenomena that they are supposed to represent.
To do this, I will discuss one specific case of endogenization, namely, the 
endogenization of selective environment by niche construction theorists. More 
specifically, I will focus on the functional extension of the abstract principle of 
heritability in natural selection theory and on its relationship with the semantic 
extension of the notion of inheritance. I will argue that the functional extension 
of the principle of heritability leads to the requirement of a semantic extension of 
‘inheritance’ and, thus, it requires a new form of coordination between the prin-
ciple of heritability and the extended domain of phenomena that is endogenized. 
Finally, I will discuss how niche construction theorists provided their own seman-
tic extension of ‘inheritance’ and I will suggest that it result from their novel 
form of coordination between theory and phenomena.
1 3
Synthese 
In Sect.  2, I will focus on contemporary reassessments of Reichenbach’s early 
view of coordination. First, I will introduce Friedman’s (2001) influential reap-
praisal of Reichenbach’s ‘axioms of coordination’. Then, I will discuss van Fraas-
sen’s (2008) critique of Reichenbach, Padovani’s (2015a, b, 2017) reassessment 
of Reichenbach’s view of coordination, and my own previous attempt to develop a 
Reichenbach-inspired view of coordination applicable to the life sciences. In Sect. 3, 
I will introduce the notion of ‘theory extension’ and the distinction between func-
tional and semantic extension. Then, I will outline Okasha’s view of endogeniza-
tion and the case of the endogenization of selective environment. After discussing 
endogenization as a strategy of theory extension, I will identify the quasi-axio-
matisation and the functional extension of certain core principles of natural selec-
tion theory as the first two stages of endogenization. In Sect. 4, I will focus on the 
effects of functional extension on coordination. First, I will clarify the connection 
between functional extension and semantic extension, by going back to the case of 
the endogenization of selective environment. Then, I will analyse the impact of the 
functional extension of the principle of heritability on the semantic extension of 
the concept of inheritance. Finally, I will discuss the way in which niche construc-
tion theorists provided a new form of coordination between theory and phenomena 
through their own semantic extension of ‘inheritance’. In Sect. 5, I will summarise 
my conclusions.
2  Reichenbach’s early view of coordination and its contemporary 
legacy
2.1  Reichenbach’s axioms of coordination
The issue of coordination was discussed by many empiricist philosophers between 
the end of the 19th and the first decades of the twentieth century, particularly by 
Ernst Mach, Moritz Schlick, and Hans Reichenbach. These scientists and phi-
losophers were concerned with the problem of how mathematical representations 
of physical structures, usually presented in the form of equations, could be ‘coor-
dinated’ with the empirical phenomena that those equations were supposed to 
describe. In other words, since mathematical structures are themselves devoid of 
empirical content, they wondered how the theoretical terms that figure as parameters 
in the equations could be given empirical content and thus, successfully represent 
concrete phenomena.
In his Habilitationsschrift, Reichenbach (1920/1965) argues that some principles 
provide the coordination between mathematical representations and their physical 
correlates, since they enable the application of those mathematical tools to empirical 
reality. For instance, the principle of genidentity (or identity over time) “indicates 
how physical concepts are to be connected in sequences in order to define ‘the same 
thing remaining identical with itself in time’” (Reichenbach, 1920/1965, p. 55). 
These ‘axioms of coordination’ can change along with the development of the math-
ematical and physical sciences, but have a constitutive character, which was one of 
the distinctive features of the Kantian synthetic a priori. According to Reichenbach, 
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we should reject the universality and necessity of the Kantian a priori, but retain the 
feature by which we constitute the concept of object, since the object of scientific 
knowledge is not immediately given: “Perceptions do not give the object, only the 
material of which it is constructed. Such constructions are achieved by an act of 
judgment. The judgment is the synthesis constructing the object from the manifold 
of the perception” (Reichenbach, 1920/1965, p. 48). Therefore, in Reichenbach’s 
view the Kantian notion of synthetic a priori can still be relevant to contempo-
rary science, inasmuch as it identifies those preconditions, expressed as principles 
or functions of thought, that are presupposed by our knowledge claims about the 
empirical world. These preconditions prescribe norms that enable the representa-
tion of our sense-experiences in terms of abstract mathematical concepts and must 
be understood as dynamic, rather than fixed and universal as in the Kantian system, 
since they can change over time.1
2.2  Reichenbachian coordination reconsidered: Friedman’s relativized a priori 
principles
In Dynamics of Reason (2001), Friedman takes inspiration from Reichenbach’s axi-
oms of coordination to develop his own systematic approach based on ‘relativized 
a priori principles’. According to Friedman’s interpretation of Reichenbach’s work, 
certain theoretical principles internal to a physical theory provide the coordination 
between mathematical representations and physical correlates. More precisely, these 
coordinating principles supply fundamental elements of the conceptual framework 
within which the theory can be formulated and empirically tested. In Friedman’s 
view, physical theoretical frameworks are comprised of a mathematical, a mechani-
cal, and an empirical component, where the mechanical part provides the coordi-
nation—that is, it establishes and justifies the referential relationship—between the 
mathematical and the empirical parts. For instance, in Newtonian mechanics, the 
three laws of motion are the mechanical part, because they coordinate the infini-
tesimal calculus, viz., its mathematical part, with the domain of concrete phenom-
ena described by the law of gravitation, viz., its empirical part (Friedman, 2001, pp. 
71–82).
Friedman’s work stimulated further research on how coordination is obtained—
within different physical theories—by means of certain theoretical principles, 
such as the light principle, the principle of equivalence, and the principle of least 
action (e.g., Ryckman, 2005; Stöltzner, 2009). According to the view of coordina-
tion shared by these authors, such principles have “a fundamental structural signifi-
cance for the theory” (Padovani, 2015a, p. 123), since they have an essential epis-
temic role as components internal to the theory itself. It follows that episodes of 
radical theoretical change usually result in a change of the coordinating principles. 
1 Reichenbach later abandoned his own interpretation of coordinating principles as constitutive of the 
object of knowledge after exchanges with Schlick, and talked instead of ‘coordinating definitions’, even-
tually giving up the project of identifying linguistic elements equivalent to the Kantian synthetic a priori 
(cf. Friedman, 1994; Oberdan, 2009).
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In Friedman’s view, this occurs during profound conceptual revolutions that involve 
Kuhnian paradigmatic shifts. For example, the transition from the paradigm of New-
tonian mechanics to that of relativistic physics was marked by a major conceptual 
shift involving a change of the coordinating principles (Friedman, 2001, pp. 25–46). 
The conceptual shift characterising the transition to the relativistic framework is 
essentially a change in the “network of inferential evidential relationships” that must 
be presupposed in order for an observation or measurement to count as evidence for 
a theoretical claim (Friedman, 2001, p. 85). In other words, the principles constitu-
tive of the new framework, i.e., the logical-mathematical principles and the coordi-
nating (mechanical) principles, provide themselves the justification for the inferen-
tial ‘jump’ from a certain piece of evidence to a theoretical claim within a certain 
framework.
2.3  Towards a ‘layered’ approach to coordination
Van Fraassen (2008) tackles the debate on coordination from a different starting 
point, in connection with the role of measurement in scientific inquiry. Our measure-
ment practices presuppose certain classifications provided by a theory of reference, 
such as the salient parameters to be measured and the relationships between them. 
However, how can we trust a theory before it has some empirical support, which is 
usually obtained via measurement?2 According to van Fraassen (2008, p. 121), the 
main function of coordination is to “determine how measurement can establish a 
value for what is measured”. On these grounds, he criticises Reichenbach’s view of 
coordination, by arguing that the axioms of coordination alone cannot account for 
the historical process through which a certain measured parameter and the proce-
dure to measure it are coordinated. Van Fraassen interprets Reichenbach’s axioms 
as a-historical and too abstract and, therefore, as inadequate to relate mathemati-
cal structures to empirical phenomena. According to van Fraassen, a new form of 
coordination cannot be obtained in isolation from its historically prior form, and the 
concurrent historical development of theory and measurement procedures must be 
analysed to understand how coordination is established.
Although she shares van Fraassen’s focus on measurement, Padovani (2015a, 
2017) rejects his negative assessment of Reichenbach’s view of coordination as 
a-historical and overly abstract. On the contrary, she argues that in Reichenbach’s 
early writings we can find several ideas that could be developed into a less ideal-
ised account of coordination, compared to some of his contemporary reappraisals 
(Padovani, 2011, 2015a). For example, Reichenbach stressed the notion of mutuality 
of coordination, meaning that coordination cannot be achieved simply by choosing 
axiomatic principles that establish the referential relationship between abstract con-
cepts and concrete phenomena. There is, in fact, some sense in which “the undefined 
side […] prescribes the order of the defined side” (Reichenbach, 1920/1965, p. 42), 
where the ‘undefined side’ is the one of perceptual experience. In other words, the 
2 Chang (2004) discusses the same issue as the ‘problem of nomic measurement’.
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level of experience is the ultimate source of empirical confirmation because only 
through experience we can establish whether the chosen axioms lead to a consistent 
form of coordination.3 Therefore, although overlooked by both Friedman and van 
Fraassen, Reichenbach’s view involved another bottom up direction of coordination 
in which empirical evidence, usually obtained via measurement, has a crucial role 
for the assessment of whether the axioms of coordination lead to univocal coordina-
tion (Padovani, 2015a).4 Most importantly, Padovani (2011) argues that not all the 
coordinating principles listed by Reichenbach may be at the same level of generality, 
since some of them, like the principle of probability, represent more fundamental 
presuppositions that are constitutive of other, less fundamental coordinating prin-
ciples. Therefore, physical coordination should be viewed as comprising different 
‘layers’, in that it involves several epistemic dimensions including theorising and 
measurement, in which various presuppositions have a coordinating function (Pado-
vani, 2015a, 2017).
In a recent paper, I took up Padovani’s suggestion and outlined a ‘layered’ view 
of coordination as an alternative to Friedman’s (Luchetti, 2018). As I discussed 
above, Friedman (2001) develops his account of the relativized a priori principles 
against the backdrop of his interpretation of Reichenbach’s work and corroborates it 
with examples from space–time physics, most notably those of Newtonian mechan-
ics and relativistic physics. In that paper, I argue that Friedman’s view of coordi-
nation is virtually inseparable from his analysis of the structure of scientific theo-
ries as composed of three epistemic layers, the empirical, the mechanical and the 
mathematical one. However, granted that this is an adequate representation of theory 
structure in space–time physics, in other scientific domains—and especially outside 
of the physical sciences—the relationship of theoretical and mathematical elements 
with the concrete phenomena that they are supposed to represent seems difficult to 
fit into a three-level structure such as the one Friedman identifies. Yet, this is not a 
good reason to abandon the perspective of coordination as a tool to understand how 
justification for the representational relationship between abstract representations 
and concrete phenomena is obtained in other scientific domains. Starting from this 
consideration, I develop a more flexible and ‘layered’ view of coordination, which I 
then apply to the case of the Hardy–Weinberg principle in population genetics.
In this paper, I do not reapply the same view, even though I share its assump-
tion that the analysis of coordination understood in a more liberal sense than Fried-
man’s, but still in the Reichenbachian spirit, can be usefully deployed for different 
purposes, some more general, others more local; some concerning epistemic ele-
ments such as scientific laws, some others concerning theoretical terms, yet others 
concerning empirical data (e.g., measurement outcomes), etc. Their common core 
3 More precisely, the level of perception ultimately allows for the choice of (measurement) values that 
lead to a univocal form of coordination, that is, a univocal mapping between measured values and con-
crete physical states. Padovani (2015b) traces the development of Reichenbach’s notion of mutuality of 
coordination—that was relatively vague in his 1920 Habilitationsschrift—in his subsequent works even 
after Reichenbach abandoned his view of the coordinating principles.




is that coordination is to be understood as a process through which the epistemic 
subjects working in a scientific framework obtain sound and non-circular justifica-
tion for the representational relationship between an abstract representational tool 
and the concrete phenomena that it represents. Crucially, the extent to which a rep-
resentation is abstract and the represented is concrete—or closer to the empirical 
world—is a matter of degree and context. Therefore, coordination can involve sev-
eral ‘layers’ at different levels of abstraction, rather than only one. Depending on 
the specific scientific inquiry under analysis, including the epistemic tools available 
(mathematical, conceptual, material, etc.), the degree of maturity of the discipline, 
and the complexity of the phenomena investigated, the number of layers comprising 
the coordination between the concrete phenomena and their abstract representation 
can vary.
Developing Reichenbach’s notion of coordination into such a nuanced perspec-
tive is useful to epistemic analyses of scientific inquiry for two reasons. First, a more 
flexible view of coordination—compared, for instance, to Friedman’s own view—
can be fruitfully applied to the life sciences, often characterised by less regimented 
theoretical structures than the physical ones. Secondly, this approach need not 
restrict its focus to episodes of radical theory change, in which relatively abstract 
mathematical principles are replaced to establish novel referential relationships. 
Rather, it provides a rationale to investigate also instances of non-revolutionary 
theoretical change, of non-theoretical scientific change, and of theory extension, in 
which the scope of a theory is extended to novel domains of phenomena.
In the rest of this paper, I will show how a more flexible understanding of coordi-
nation can provide us with a systematic approach to analyse the development of sci-
entific concepts from the interaction between the evidential and theoretical advance-
ments in a context of theory extension. More specifically, I will show how it can 
be usefully applied to better understand some epistemic and conceptual intricacies 
resulting from the process of endogenization in evolutionary biology.
3  Theory extension in evolutionary biology: analysing the strategy 
of endogenization
3.1  Theory extension and its impact on coordination
When a scientific theory extends its range of application to phenomena beyond the 
ones for which it was originally conceived and developed, we clearly do not witness 
a case of theory replacement but, rather, of theory extension. With theory exten-
sion some phenomena—whether they were previously accounted for by another 
theory or not—are internalised by a pre-existing theory. In other words, the scope 
of certain theoretical principles or concepts of the pre-existing theory is extended to 
a domain of phenomena larger than the one for which they were previously used. In 
some cases, as I will suggest, such an extension has an impact on the coordination 
between theory and phenomena. This means that theory extension involves a change 
in how scientists justify the referential relationship between the phenomena and the 
abstract conceptual resources used to represent them.
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Indeed, some cases of theory extension may seem to fit a rather straightforward 
narrative of scientific growth, by which scientists discover that certain already-estab-
lished empirical regularities hold also in novel domains, thus leading to an extension 
of the explanatory scope of the theory. In some others, theory extension appears to 
involve a process resulting in the extension of the referential power of some prin-
ciples or concepts.5 In this second case it seems that the meaning of certain terms 
used in the theory changes, by leading to what Chang (2004, p. 150) has labelled 
semantic extension:
I will use the phrase semantic extension to indicate any situation in which a 
concept takes on any sort of meaning in a new domain. We start with a con-
cept with a secure net of uses giving it stable meaning in a restricted domain 
of circumstances. The extension of such a concept consists in giving it a secure 
net of uses credibly linked to the earlier net, in an adjacent domain. Semantic 
extension can happen in various ways: operationally, metaphysically, theoreti-
cally, or most likely in some combination of all those ways in any given case.6
Chang’s notion of semantic extension indicates that the referential scope of a term 
has been extended, by stretching its applicability to empirical phenomena different 
from the one(s) to which it was initially supposed to refer.7 The increased referential 
power of this term can be justified by means of metaphysical assumptions, by rely-
ing on a set of physical operations (such as measurement procedures), by relying on 
theoretical justifications, or by different combinations of these.
However, as I will discuss more in-depth in Sect. 4, a theory can be extended for 
certain modelling, explanatory or, in general, theorising purposes, while this exten-
sion per se may fail to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the semantic 
extension of some terms that are embedded in the theory. In these cases, the seman-
tic extension of a theoretical term could be better conceived as a final, mature stage 
of a process of theory extension, where the latter starts with the functional extension 
of some abstract theoretical resources, i.e., their extension for modelling, explana-
tory or, in general, theorising purposes. In the rest of this section, I will discuss a 
case of theory extension in evolutionary biology to analyse the relationship between 
functional and semantic extension and their impact on the coordination of the theory 
with the phenomena that it describes.
6 Italics in the original text.
7 See, for instance, Wilson (1982) for a formal treatment of a similar idea.
5 This idea of extension as a cognitive operation aimed at expanding the domain of applicability of a 
concept or lawful statement to an empirical domain different from the one of origin was already devel-
oped by the logical empiricists, who emphasised the conventional aspects of this operation. Cf. Carnap 
(1936, especially pp. 445–446), but also Waismann (1968, pp. 118–119) on ‘open-texture’ and Lakatos 
(1976, pp. 99–100) on ‘concept stretching’ for similar notions.
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3.2  Okasha’s view of endogenization in evolutionary biology
Okasha (2018) has recently provided an interesting analysis of how biologists, while 
doing evolutionary modelling, treat certain variables as endogenous, since they rep-
resent the evolutionary forces deemed to be active, while they assume other vari-
ables as exogenous, in that they represent background conditions of evolution by 
natural selection. Okasha identifies a broad trend in evolutionary biology over many 
decades by which exogenous variables, usually treated as background presupposi-
tions of evolution by natural selection, are ‘endogenized’ in the domain of possi-
ble evolutionary theorising. In a nutshell, endogenization boils down to taking some 
phenomena so far believed not to be directly accountable for in terms of natural 
selection theory but, rather, idealised away as variables that constitute its back-
ground conditions, and describing them as products of evolution by natural selec-
tion. This theoretical strategy is so pervasive in evolutionary biology that the histori-
cal development of this discipline can be viewed as a “successive endogenization of 
variables that previous theorists had treated as exogenous” (Okasha, 2018, p. 3).
One particularly striking aspect of endogenization is that the same theoretical 
resources deployed at later stages to account for these background presuppositions 
required at an earlier stage the backgrounding of those very presuppositions, in order 
to identify and develop the core theoretical principles in the first place. In other 
words, while these background variables had initially been assumed as fixed, so that 
the theory of natural selection could explain another host of phenomena, such as 
adaptation, speciation, and phylogenesis, at a later stage the very same theory sup-
plied an explanation of these variables, which from fixed idealised presuppositions 
became endogenized phenomena. To clarify how endogenization works, I analyse 
one case that will also provide the material for my discussion of the impact of theory 
extension on coordination: the endogenization of (selective) environment.
Within the neo-Darwinian framework, the environment is considered as the factor 
that exerts selective pressures on organisms.8 Organisms, in response to these pres-
sures, evolve adaptations via natural selection to ‘fit’ the environment. Therefore, the 
environment is treated as an exogenous variable, it is considered as an external factor 
for evolution by natural selection. This assumption has been challenged by research-
ers working in the field of niche construction theory. These scientists emphasise that 
organisms can fit the environment not only by evolving adaptations through natu-
ral selection, but also by transforming the environment during their lifespan. They 
do so, for instance, by regularly modifying local resource distributions, by choosing 
8 The Modern Synthesis or neo-Darwinian framework is the result of the process of unification of Dar-
win’s theory of natural selection and Mendelian genetics. This process was rich in controversies and 
required the contribution of numerous scientists with different specialisations (cf. Mayr & Provine, 
1980). Already by the 1970s, biologists from different subdisciplines started challenging the adequacy of 
Neo-Darwinism as a theoretical framework for all evolutionary phenomena in the biological realm. Sci-
entists working in fields that were underrepresented at the times of the building of the Modern Synthesis, 
such as embryology, developmental biology, and ecology, put pressure in the direction of shifting from 
the Modern Synthesis to an extended evolutionary synthesis. The resulting debate is still heated (cf. e.g., 
Scheiner, 2010; Laland et al., 2014; Pigliucci & Müller, 2010).
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and changing habitats, or by constructing artefacts. These activities are widespread 
in the animal kingdom, among both vertebrates and invertebrates, from beavers 
building dams and badgers constructing burrow systems, to birds building nests, and 
yet to spiders weaving nets. In addition, it is typical of plants, too, since they change 
numerous traits of their habitats, including temperature, humidity, chemical com-
position, acidity, patterns of light and shade, etc. Most organisms contribute to the 
construction of their environmental niches.
In an influential book, Odling-Smee et al. (2003) argue that these niche construct-
ing activities emerge as responses to external selective pressures. At the same time, 
by transforming the environment, these activities contribute to changing the selec-
tive pressures which, in turn, prompt further adaptive responses from the organisms 
and, therefore, affect their fitness.9 In other words, niche construction is not simply a 
modification of the environment per se: it is a modification of the selective environ-
ment induced by organisms themselves. As a result of this change in selective pres-
sures, members of many species inherit the cumulative environmental changes that 
previous generations have induced. The effects of niche construction can overturn 
external sources of selective pressure and give rise to unusual evolutionary trajecto-
ries and equilibria, for instance by fixating otherwise deleterious alleles.
The interactions between genetic and ecological inheritance can echo into mac-
roevolutionary patterns, as in the case of the evolution of photosynthesis in early 
bacteria that led to an increase of oxygen in the atmosphere and, consequently, to the 
evolution of organisms capable of aerobic respiration (Danchin et al., 2011; Erwin, 
2008). These effects are particularly striking in the case of human evolution. Laland 
et  al. (2010) summarise decades of studies on how gene-culture interactions have 
shaped human evolution. As they highlight, anthropological studies and data from 
the human genome systematically converge in showing that numerous genes have 
been subject to positive selection as a response to cultural practices.10 Therefore, 
human evolution cannot simply be understood as a process of adaptation to changes 
in the environment caused by events beyond human control. On the contrary, gene-
culture dynamics can have fast and sizeable evolutionary consequences, so that it 
can be considered one of the most relevant patterns of human evolution.
In sum, according to niche construction theorists, the organism-environment 
interactions typical of a species cannot be ignored when analysing evolutionary 
dynamics, since they fundamentally affect the strength and direction of the selective 
pressures on that species and others. Including the process of niche construction in 
the domain of phenomena accounted for by natural selection allows for the incor-
poration of environmental components and their interactions with the biological 
realm in evolutionary modelling. In epistemological terms, this move is prompted 
9 Earlier papers outlining the core ideas of the book are Laland et al. (1996, 1999), Odling-Smee (1988), 
and Odling-Smee et al. (1996). Lewontin (1982, 1983) anticipated some lines of research they develop. 
Interestingly, already Darwin (1881) attributed an important role to the environment in the mechanism of 
inheritance (cf. Provine, 1971, Chapter 1).
10 One classic case study is that of how dairy farming provided the selective environment for the posi-
tive selection of alleles for lactose tolerance in adults. Aoki (1986) and Feldman & Cavalli-Sforza (1989) 
developed the first models. See also Holden and Mace (1997) and Gerbault et al. (2011).
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by recognising the idealising character of the assumption that the only way for 
organisms to respond to selection pressures from the environment is by evolving 
adaptations. This idealisation is not universally justifiable, since niche construc-
tion demonstrates how organisms can fit the environment by transforming the lat-
ter, and this variable should be taken into consideration in evolutionary modelling, 
when relevant to the modelling goal. Incorporating niche construction represents an 
attempt at endogenizing the environment, that is, at bringing the formerly exogenous 
variable of the environment within the scope of evolutionary theorising. What is 
endogenized, in this case, is the selective environment, that can be understood as a 
variable co-evolving with the traits (i.e., the niche constructing activities) evolved by 
the organism to interact with the environment itself.
3.3  Endogenization as theory extension
The case of niche construction is just a representative example of how endogeniza-
tion works. Other variables that had been taken as background conditions of evolu-
tion by natural selection, including hierarchical organization, individuality, mutation 
rate, sex, genetic recombination, fair meiosis, population structure, etc., were sub-
ject to endogenization.11 This process did not unfold exactly in the same way in all 
cases, and it did not bring identical results. For instance, some variables, such as 
the environment, have only been partially endogenized, whereas others have been 
completely explained away, as in the case of mutation rate. However, all these lines 
of theorising share a common underlying epistemic mechanism. With the notion of 
endogenization, Okasha captures a specific type of theory extension in evolutionary 
biology, whereby phenomena that were idealised away as background presupposi-
tions in previous formulations of Darwinian natural selection theory could later be 
accounted for by that same theory.
On a surface level, the progressive endogenization of background variables in 
the history of evolutionary theory fits a narrative of cumulative progress, according 
to which “evolutionary biologists have responded to various crises by augmenting 
the preexisting framework, building on what was already there” (Pigliucci, 2007, 
p. 2743). In other words, Okasha’s notion of endogenization seems fully consist-
ent with the view that evolutionary biologists react to the discovery of new phe-
nomena or to the emergence of conceptual issues by extending the application of 
already-established theoretical tools, rather than by developing alternative theoreti-
cal frameworks or suggesting radical conceptual shifts. In addition, his analysis of 
endogenization complements previous scholarly work focusing on how evolutionary 
theorising was deployed beyond the life sciences, as it was used in the study of ani-
mal behaviour (Avital & Jablonka, 2000; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005), in certain areas 
of psychology (Campbell, 1960), and in the study of culture, including language, 
morality, and science itself (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 
1981; Hull, 1988). By showing how endogenization worked as a strategy of theory 
11 Cf. Okasha (2018) and references therein.
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extension directed at certain presuppositions of the theory itself, Okasha provides 
further systematic evidence of the historical process during which the theoretical 
resources of evolution by natural selection progressively expanded their scope.
From an epistemological perspective, Okasha (2018, p. 2) characterises endogeni-
zation as “a particular way in which the generality of evolutionary theory has been 
increased over time”. More specifically, he seems to suggest that the generality of 
the core principles of Darwinian evolution, that is, the possibility to provide an 
abstract formulation of these principles, enabled endogenization as a strategy of the-
orising to flourish.12 Although he does not elaborate more on this aspect, Okasha’s 
point echoes with Wimsatt’s (1987) epistemological analysis of how evolutionary 
theorising could be applied beyond the life sciences. Wimsatt discusses the exam-
ple of the theory of evolution by natural selection to suggest that certain theoretical 
principles can be abstracted away from their context of origin, so that they become 
less tied to the empirical details of the domain within which they were initially for-
mulated. This process of abstraction makes these resources ‘portable’ from the old 
domain to new ones, in which they can serve some explanatory or representational 
role. This is the case, for example, of evolutionary epistemology, that describes the 
development of science according to the explanatory scheme of evolution by natural 
selection.
In the rest of this section, I will build on Okasha’s and Wimsatt’s considerations 
to systematically analyse endogenization as a process that unfolds through differ-
ent stages. My goal is to carefully distinguish among the effects of endogenization 
at the level of abstract theoretical principles, those at the level of the phenomena 
accounted for by the theory, and those concerning the relationship between these 
two levels, that involve several epistemic components. Although I will only focus on 
one of these components, namely, the concept of ‘inheritance’ and its relationship 
to the theoretical principle of heritability, I will show that a ‘layered’ perspective on 
coordination can be effectively deployed to analyse some of the epistemic and con-
ceptual effects of endogenization as a widespread modelling strategy in evolutionary 
biology. Not only will this analysis provide a deeper explanation of these effects 
than the one offered by Okasha in terms of the greater generality of the theory; it 
will also show that the notion of coordination, if suitably interpreted, can be applied 
to reconstruct cases of theory extension in the life sciences.
3.4  Stages of endogenization: quasi‑axiomatisation and functional extension
In the context of the heated debate on the levels of selection, Lewontin (1970) for-
mulated a distilled version of Darwin’s (1859) fundamental explanatory structure 
in the form of three principles that underpin the theory of evolution by natural 
12 Okasha (2018, p. 18) carefully emphasises that endogenization shows that the core Darwinian prin-
ciples do not “bear the explanatory burden in evolutionary biology, but rather those principles as they 
operate in specific biological settings, in the presence of additional contingent biological features”, thus 




selection.13 These three principles can be applied to any of the different units of 
selection (molecule, cell, organism, group of organisms, species), and, therefore, 
have been considered as a sort of ‘recipe’ for evolutionary change (Godfrey-Smith, 
2007, 2009a). The principles, as worded by Lewontin (1970, p. 1), are the following:
 (i) Different individuals in a population have different morphologies, physiolo-
gies, and behaviors (phenotypic variation)
 (ii) Different phenotypes have different rates of survival and reproduction in dif-
ferent environments (differential fitness)
 (iii) There is a correlation between parents and offspring in the contribution of each 
to future generations (fitness is heritable).
What Lewontin provides is a quasi-axiomatisation of evolution by natural selection 
in terms of the principles of variation (V), differential fitness (DF), and heritability 
(H).14 On the one hand, this is the result of an individuation and extraction of three 
principles from the informal Darwinian formulation of the theory (Griesemer, 2013, 
pp. 306–307). This extraction also required an operation of abstraction from a large 
amount of empirical observations, from which Darwin originally inferred the struc-
ture of the mechanism of evolution by natural selection (Wimsatt, 1987).15 These 
three principles evidently involve abstract mathematical and statistical concepts 
(variation as a statistical distribution, fitness as rates of survival and reproduction, 
heritability as intergenerational correlation), even though they are not expressed in 
mathematical form.16
On the other hand, this quasi-axiomatisation also resorts to idealisation,17 since 
it leaves out variables deemed as crucial by Darwin himself, such as the famous 
notion of struggle for existence. More precisely, idealisation contributes to fixing 
the epistemic function of these three core Darwinian principles so as to make them 
14 The prefix ‘quasi’ denotes that these principles were not expressed in rigorous formal terms.
15 In the case of the principle of heritability, it may be pointed out that Galton already made available an 
abstract statistical concept of heritability a long time before Lewontin’s formulation. However, the rea-
son behind Galton’s statistical concept of heritability was that of black-boxing the mechanism of genetic 
inheritance, that had not yet been (re)discovered. In my view, this epistemic move is quite different from 
that of formulating a general principle of heritability through abstraction from known details, as in the 
case of Lewontin’s formulation.
16 See Lewontin (1985, p. 76) for a slightly different, and somewhat clearer, formulation of the core prin-
ciples. More specifically, Lewontin (1985) expresses the principle of heritability more explicitly in terms 
of intergenerational correlation of variation, rather than involving the notion of fitness, as in the 1970 
paper. Cf. Godfrey-Smith (2009a) for a discussion.
17 Idealisation is often described as the omission and/or distortion of relevant variables with the aims 
of simplification. Still, as in the case of abstraction, it is a placeholder term that refers to a variety of 
activities. For a survey of different modes of idealisations deployed in the sciences, see Auyang (1999) 
and Potochnik (2017). For more on abstraction and idealisation in evolutionary biology specifically, see 
Godfrey-Smith (2009b).
13 The question of the levels of selection was at the centre of a debate that originated already at the 
times of Darwin but reached a turning point when, starting from the 1960s, many evolutionary biolo-
gists argued that natural selection can indeed operate on multiple levels: genes, organisms, or groups. Cf. 
Hamilton (1963), Lewontin (1970), Maynard-Smith (1976), Price (1970, 1972), and Williams (1966). 
For historical background on the levels of selection controversy, see Okasha (2005, 2006).
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the most relevant explanatory variables within the theory, in comparison both to pre-
vious formulations and to other variables that were fixed as background presuppo-
sitions of natural selection, such as individuality, the environment, etc. By ‘fixing 
the epistemic function’, I mean that some component of a theory is held fixed with 
respect to its epistemic role. For instance, the more rigorously a concept is defined, 
the more it is possible to deploy it unambiguously for a certain epistemic purpose, 
such as quantifying the effects of a phenomenon across a wide variety of empirical 
inquiries. If we take the concept of ‘fitness’, the more rigorously it is defined as a 
measure of reproductive success, the more it is possible to use it to test the effects 
of selection. This does not mean that mathematisation is the only way to set fixed 
some epistemic components, nor that quantification is the only epistemic function of 
interest. This short example is just meant to clarify that the fixing of the epistemic 
function of a component endows it with a quasi-definitional status, thus (temporar-
ily) bracketing the possibility of modifying or replacing it, so that other parts of the 
theory comprising it can be developed or empirical claims based on it tested. The 
fixing of the epistemic function must not be confused with the fixing of the meaning 
of a concept or principle.
Lewontin’s quasi-axiomatisation is not the only form of regimentation of the the-
ory of evolution by natural selection that has been developed in the history of evolu-
tionary biology.18 However, it was a highly influential one, especially in the context 
of the levels of selection debate, since it showed that evolutionary change does not 
necessarily happen only at the level of individual organisms, as was implied by the 
neo-Darwinian framework. For instance, his three principles abstract and idealise 
away from the assumption that natural selection only operates on individual organ-
isms, understood as genetically discrete and homogeneous units. Variation, differ-
ential fitness, and heritability represent the enabling conditions for natural selection 
to operate on populations of individuals, where ‘individual’ does not refer to any 
privileged type of biological entity, but it can be applied to all the different hierar-
chical levels (molecules, cells, organisms, groups). Therefore, Lewontin’s principles 
became a powerful tool to argue for group-level selection and show that the assump-
tion of hierarchical organisation of the biological realm could not be considered 
merely as a given background presupposition of the theory of natural selection, but 
that it could be explained in terms of those very principles.19
In a nutshell, the fixing of the epistemic function of the three core Darwinian 
principles and their abstraction from specific empirical domains was essential to 
extend their applicability to model phenomena that were previously idealised away 
as background variables, so that these could be represented as products of natural 
selection. Therefore, the quasi-axiomatisation of the core Darwinian principles can 
18 Lewontin was influenced by Mary Williams’ (1970, 1973) axiomatisation, that was circulating already 
at the end of the 1960s. Barberousse & Samadi (2015) and Godfrey-Smith (2009a) develop two contem-
porary alternatives, both of which add some variables to the original three Lewontinian principles, thus 
de-idealising from it, and problematise the correct interpretation and formal characterisation of the three 
principles themselves.
19 Cf. Maynard-Smith (1976) on group level selection and Okasha (2018, Sect. 3.5) for more details on 
the endogenization of hierarchical organisation.
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be understood as the first stage of endogenization, since abstraction and idealisation, 
as Wimsatt (1987) argues, increase the quantity of conceptual dependencies that the 
principles can sustain, thus enhancing their ‘portability’, i.e., the possibility to apply 
them to novel empirical domains. Consequently, the second stage of endogenization 
is the functional extension of the core Darwinian principles, such that they are used 
to account for phenomena formerly represented as idealised background variables 
(Table 1). As an upshot of the functional extension of the principles of variation, dif-
ferential fitness, and heritability, the formerly idealised background variables, such 
as that of hierarchical organisation, become endogenized phenomena.
In the case of niche construction theory, discussed in Sect.  3.2, the variable of 
selective environment is endogenized since it is accounted for as a product of nat-
ural selection. This can also be viewed as resulting from the quasi-axiomatisation 
and functional extension of the three core Darwinian principles. According to niche 
construction theorists, phenotypic differences in the modes of interaction between 
organisms and environment (variation), that are considered to be heritable (heritabil-
ity), although not only through biological reproduction, provide a selective advan-
tage (differential fitness) to the organism-environment niche. This means that the 
theoretical scope of the core Darwinian principles is extended to describe a phe-
nomenon that was not previously considered as influencing evolutionary dynam-
ics, namely, the niche-constructing activities. Since niche-constructing activities 
change the environment, and these changes produce further transformations both 
in the distribution of phenotypic variations and in the selective pressures cumula-
tively inherited by future generations, the variable of selective environment is the 
endogenized component. In the next section, I will move on to consider how the 
functional extension of theoretical principles impacts the coordination between the-
ory and phenomena.
4  Semantic extension and coordination in the endogenization 
of selective environment
4.1  From functional extension to semantic extension
In this section, I will argue that the functional extension of the core Darwinian prin-
ciples has an impact on certain fundamental concepts involved in the coordination 
between theory and phenomena. More specifically, I will argue that the functional 
extension of these abstract principles requires the semantic extension of some con-
cepts that enable the concrete applicability of the principles to the empirical real-
ity. Therefore, semantic extension can be viewed as resulting from a change of the 
coordination between the principles and the phenomena that they are supposed to 
represent. To do that, I will zoom in on the case of the endogenization of selective 
environment by niche construction theorists that I presented in Sect. 3.2.
More precisely, I will focus on the functional extension of the principle of herit-
ability and on how it leads to the requirement of a semantic extension of the concept 
‘inheritance’. In this context, I will consider heritability as an abstract theoretical 
principle like the one formulated by Lewontin, that is, as a general precondition of 
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natural selection that refers to the presence of an intergenerational correlation in 
phenotypic variation distributions, rather than as any of the specific measures of 
heritability as they are conceived in the neo-Darwinian framework.20 The notion of 
inheritance, on the other hand, identifies the concrete mechanism(s) of intergenera-
tional transmission and retention of variation and it can be viewed as providing a 
key piece of the coordination between the abstract principle of heritability and its 
physical correlate, namely, the actual patterns of phenotypic similarity across popu-
lations due to the retention and transmission of variation. In other words, the scope 
extension of the principle of heritability to model and, eventually, endogenize cer-
tain variables calls for an extension of the referential scope of ‘inheritance’, without, 
however, delimiting its precise scope. This can be viewed as a gap in the coordina-
tion between theory and phenomena resulting from endogenization, although plausi-
bly not the only one, and it is the source of the current conceptual controversies over 
the correct meaning of ‘inheritance’.
As we have seen, in niche construction theory the endogenized variable is that 
of selective environment. Yet, the endogenization of selective environment seems 
to rely on a different meaning of ‘inheritance’ than the one of genetic inheritance 
assumed by the neo-Darwinian framework, namely, the transmission of genetic 
material from parents to offspring during reproduction, taken to be responsible for 
phenotypic heritability. In fact, niche construction theorists assume another dimen-
sion of inheritance, on top of the genetic one: “Selected habitats, modified habitats, 
and modified sources of natural selection in those habitats are also transmitted by 
the same organisms to their descendants, as a consequence of their niche-construct-
ing activities, through a second general inheritance system in evolution, ecological 
inheritance” (Odling-Smee, 2007, p. 278).
Ecological inheritance is an indirect type of inheritance, in contrast to the direct 
transmission of genes from parents to offspring, since it does not directly involve a 
generational event, but happens through the medium of the environment. Why then 
call it inheritance? What is the justification for extending the referential scope of 
Table 1  Stages and outcomes of endogenization from quasi-axiomatisation to functional extension
Stage (1) Quasi-axiomatisation (2) Functional extension
Outcome Abstraction of the principles → more generality
Idealisation → fixing of the epistemic function of 
the principles
Use of the principles to model  
previously backgrounded  
phenomena → endogenization
20 More on this in the next section. Within the neo-Darwinian framework, the notion of heritability 
refers to the ways of measuring how much of the variation of a phenotypic trait can be attributed to 
variation of genetic factors, as opposed to environmental influences. Different mathematical definitions 
of heritability coexist within neo-Darwinian theory, including heritability as parent–offspring covari-
ance and heritability as additive genetic portion of phenotypic variance of a trait (also called narrow-
sense heritability, contrasted with broad-sense heritability, that identifies all the genetic contributions to 
a population’s phenotypic variance). Understandably, the compresence of several definitions and ways of 
measuring heritability has been at the root of some misunderstandings among biologists (cf. Jacquard, 
1983; Visscher et al., 2008).
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this term? If we look at the debates on the meaning of ‘inheritance’, we quickly 
acknowledge that this is far from being a settled issue in evolutionary biology. In 
what follows, I outline the gist of the controversy on the correct semantic extension 
of ‘inheritance’ and I discuss how it relates to both the process of endogenization 
and the topic of coordination.
4.2  When coordination collapses: conceptual controversies over ‘extended 
inheritance’
As I mentioned above, Lewontin’s principle of heritability merely implies a statisti-
cal correlation in the retention of changes of phenotypic variation across genera-
tions.21 What Lewontin had in mind was an abstract descriptive characterisation of 
a correlation in terms of the statistical measure that biologists use to model evolu-
tionary dynamics, rather than a causal notion of inheritance as a set of physical sys-
tems or processes responsible for that state. Within the neo-Darwinian framework, 
heritability has different mathematical definitions aimed at quantifying the amount 
of phenotypic variation of a trait in a population that is due to genetic variation. 
Among them, we have heritability as parent–offspring covariance, that is the one 
presupposed by Lewontin’s abstract principle. Indeed, Lewontin’s principle does 
imply that a certain amount of phenotypic variation is due to variation of genetic 
factors, but its abstract characterisation allows for the intergenerational correlation 
in variation distributions to include other factors that influence heritability via non-
genetic channels.22
However, the crucial point is that, within the neo-Darwinian framework, one sin-
gle mechanism is responsible for this statistical correlation: genetic inheritance, that 
is, the transmission of stretches of DNA between parents and offspring via reproduc-
tion. In this sense, it may be said that, within the neo-Darwinian framework, the 
term ‘inheritance’ only refers to the mechanism of genetic inheritance. This refer-
ential relationship justifies the possibility to represent actual patterns of phenotypic 
similarity due to the retention and transmission of variation in terms of a statistical 
correlation implied by the principle of heritability. This is possible because, given 
the neo-Darwinian definition of ‘inheritance’, one single physical process realises 
the retention and transmission of variation, viz., genetic inheritance. In other words, 
the identification of inheritance with the causal mechanism of genetic inheritance 
21 Here, I am referring to his 1985 formulation of the principle, in which he corrected his 1970 version 
where he expressed the principle of heritability in terms of ‘heritability of fitness’.
22 In this sense, an abstract principle of heritability such as the one formulated by Lewontin differs from 
the definitions of heritability, understood as actual measures of the degree of variation of a phenotypic 
trait in a population that is due to genetic variation between individuals in that population, with respect 
to their epistemic role. In terms of a ‘layered’ view of coordination, these mathematical definitions of 
heritability are to be regarded as belonging to an additional epistemic dimension, namely, the one of 
measurement, which is involved in the representational relationship between the theoretical principle of 
heritability as a precondition for natural selection, inheritance as a core concept of the theory, and the 
actual presence of an intergenerational correlation of phenotypic variation in a Darwinian population. 
Understanding the role of heritability measures would clearly be a crucial complement to the analysis I 
provide in this paper, but it will require a separate treatment. I thank an anonymous reviewer for asking 
me to clarify this point.
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is a central piece that, within the neo-Darwinian framework, enables the univocal 
coordination between physical states and their abstract representation as a statistical 
correlation, since it prescribes that the only phenotypic variation that is heritable is 
the one rooted in the transmission via the genetic channel.
This identification has been challenged by the rise of new subdisciplines of evo-
lutionary biology, such as developmental systems theory, gene-culture co-evolution 
theories, and epigenetics. Scientists working in these fields refer by the label of ‘non-
genetic inheritance’ to other causal factors (variously conceptualised as systems, 
channels, mechanisms, or processes) that influence the retention of changes in vari-
ation distributions within and across generations, such as epigenetic, behavioural, 
ecological, and cultural factors. Consequently, many proposals for an extended con-
cept of inheritance have been put forward (Danchin et al., 2011; Griffiths & Gray, 
1994; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; Odling-Smee, 2007; Sterelny et al., 1996).
However, the proliferation of putative inheritance systems as a reaction to the 
restrictive neo-Darwinian identification of inheritance with the genetic mechanism 
has raised the worry of obtaining, as a result, an over-inclusive concept of inherit-
ance. This worry refers to two possible deleterious effects. First, an overly extended 
notion of inheritance might create problems when it comes to formal modelling of 
evolutionary dynamics (Odling-Smee, 2007). The neo-Darwinian identification of 
genetic inheritance as the only mechanism preserving the retention of changes in 
variation distributions among generations is certainly a strong idealisation. Yet, this 
idealisation served the modelling purpose well, as testified by the great achieve-
ments of population genetics in the twentieth century. The second issue comes from 
the view that most of the proposals to extend ‘inheritance’ assume that every form 
of transmission is a form of inheritance (Merlin, 2017).
In my view, reconceptualising ‘inheritance’ is needed partly as a direct conse-
quence of the functional extension of the principle of heritability. This functional 
extension—as I have shown in the case of niche construction theory—is aimed at 
modelling phenotypic similarity that was previously idealised away. Niche construc-
tion theorists have extended the domain of application of the principle of herita-
bility, together with that of variation and differential fitness, to model the changes 
in the distribution of phenotypic traits that result from niche constructing activities 
in evolutionary terms. However, due to this functional extension, the coordination 
between the principle of heritability and the parent–offspring covariance in pheno-
typic similarity as it is conceived within neo-Darwinian theory can no longer hold.
More precisely, the functional extension of the principle of heritability breaks the 
identification of ‘inheritance’ with genetic inheritance, which was a crucial piece of 
that coordination. As I discussed above, this is the case because this identification 
prescribes that the only phenotypic variation that is heritable is the one rooted in the 
transmission via the genetic channel. In addition, the functional extension of herit-
ability leads to the necessity of a reconceptualization, or semantic extension, of the 
term ‘inheritance’, so as to include more processes responsible for phenotypic simi-
larity, albeit without providing clear boundaries for its extension (Fig. 1). This ‘col-
lapse’ of the representational relationship between the principle of heritability and 
its physical correlates can be understood through the lenses of coordination analysis. 
In fact, a central component that justified the representational relationship between 
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the principle of heritability (together with the other principles underlying natural 
selection theory) and its concrete domain of phenomena until the functional exten-
sion, i.e., an agreed-upon notion of inheritance, is now missing (Fig. 2).
As I mentioned above, Merlin (2017) argues that current proposals for extend-
ing ‘inheritance’ fail to do this properly, since they include types of transmission 
that are not in line with what she calls the ‘theoretical role of inheritance’ in 
natural selection theory. For instance, forms of horizontal and oblique transmis-
sion, such as epigenetic lateral gene transfer or cultural inheritance, which bypass 
inter-generational transmission via reproduction, are merely ways of acquiring 
new variations, and not of cumulating already existing variations and preserving 
their continuity across generations, as the theoretical role of inheritance would 
prescribe.
Merlin’s point is worth dwelling on. The problem she raises is how to reconceptu-
alise ‘inheritance’ in the light of empirical evidence of new causally relevant factors, 
other than genetic ones, influencing the retention in changes of variation distribu-
tions across generations. This conceptualisation should refer to all those physical 
realisers that contribute to inheritance but leave out those physical realisers that 
Fig. 1  Unfolding of the effects of the functional extension of the principle of heritability on the concept 
of inheritance. The arrows indicate the succession of stages
Fig. 2  Representation of the effects of functional extension with respect to the layer of theoretical 
abstraction of the epistemic components and of their relationships
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merely contribute to the acquisition of variation. To do that, she appeals to the theo-
retical role of inheritance and refers to Lewontin’s formulation of the principle of 
heritability. Lewontin’s formulation states that a statistical correlation holds between 
parents and offspring and, therefore, according to Merlin, it requires that transmis-
sion must occur in a parent–offspring lineage, and not, for instance, within the same 
generation. In addition, these correlations relate to the contribution of parents and 
offspring to future generations, therefore implying continuity across generations and 
the cumulation of variation across time. In Merlin’s view, if we assume that a mech-
anism of transmission, without preserving continuity and cumulation of variation, is 
sufficient for inheritance, we make the mistake of including physical mechanisms or 
processes which only realise acquisition of variation rather than inheritance.
Merlin’s argument seems to presuppose a specific reading of the concept ‘inherit-
ance’ out of Lewontin’s abstract formulation of the principle of heritability. Yet, the 
requirements that make up Merlin’s ‘theoretical role of inheritance’ do not seem to 
be uncontroversial, and different interpretations of the principle of heritability seem 
to guide different choices concerning the extension of the term ‘inheritance’.
For example, Charbonneau (2014) argues that parent–offspring lineages are not 
necessary for a population to undergo Darwinian natural selection, as Lewontin’s 
principle of heritability would seem to require, according to Merlin. Therefore, in 
Charbonneau’s view, ‘inheritance’ should not refer only to vertical transmission, 
viz., transmission between parents and offspring, as the only system that preserves 
transgenerational retention of changes in variation distributions. Rather, generation 
and memory, which Charbonneau (2014, p. 739) defines “without reference to a spe-
cific biological ontology of entities and processes”, suffice to guarantee transmis-
sion, continuity, and cumulation of changes in variation distributions. Generation 
and memory can be physically realised by mechanisms other than genetic trans-
mission, as in the case of diffused ecological inheritance. Although Charbonneau 
emphasises the contrast between his view and Lewontin’s formulation of the prin-
ciple of heritability, it could rather be considered as a development of Lewontin’s 
quasi-axiomatisation. In fact, Charbonneau explicitly abstracts away from par-
ent–offspring lineages, while preserving the functional role of the principle of herit-
ability as an abstract precondition for natural selection.
4.3  Semantic extension as a result of novel coordination: the case of ecological 
inheritance
Let us now go back to niche construction theory and the endogenization of selec-
tive environment. As I mentioned in Sect. 4.1, niche construction theorists extend 
the notion of inheritance to encompass ecological inheritance in addition to genetic 
inheritance. Ecological inheritance is an indirect system of inheritance since it does 
not require vertical transmission or reproduction. Rather, it happens through the 
medium of the environment, which is modified by the niche-constructing activi-
ties of the organisms. The cumulative effects of these modifications influence future 
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generations in that they directly produce durable changes in the distribution of cer-
tain phenotypic variations or, more deeply, by modifying selective pressures.23
However, one might wonder—on the lines of Merlin’s argument—whether 
that counts as inheritance, and not as acquisition of new variations. Accord-
ing to Odling-Smee (2007, p. 280), ecological inheritance is indeed inheritance 
“because some of the environmental consequences caused by the repeated niche-
constructing activities of multiple generations of organisms in their environments 
accumulate or persist in environments across generations”. The function of cumu-
lation and continuity in the transmission of changes in variation distributions is 
satisfied by ecological inheritance, even though the transmission has high fidelity 
only in its interaction with genetic inheritance (Odling-Smee & Laland, 2011). 
The quote above illustrates that niche construction theorists have reconceptual-
ized the notion of inheritance by extending it in such a way that it refers also to 
the system of ecological inheritance. At the same time, their semantic extension 
of ‘inheritance’ is in line with what they assume is its core epistemic role, that 
is, the concept enabling the identification of those systems that contribute to the 
retention of changes in variation distributions by means of transmission, cumula-
tion and continuity.
The reconceptualization of ‘inheritance’ proposed by niche construction theorists 
should be viewed, as I did for Merlin’s and Charbonneau’s proposals, also in con-
nection with their interpretation of the principle of heritability. As I discussed above, 
niche construction theorists functionally extended the core Darwinian principles to 
model niche-constructing activities in terms of evolutionary dynamics, thus leading 
to the endogenization of the variable of selective environment. Yet, the functional 
extension of the principle of heritability, implemented to account for the (kinds of) 
phenotypic similarity that could not be causally explained in terms of genetic inher-
itance, undermined the identification of ‘inheritance’ with the mechanism of genetic 
inheritance. This identification is, within the neo-Darwinian framework, crucial to 
coordinate the principle of heritability as one of the general theoretical precondi-
tions for natural selection and concrete patterns of phenotypic similarity, since it 
posits that only phenotypic variation produced by genetic inheritance is heritable. 
The abandonment of this identification requires the search for a new, more abstract, 
and more inclusive concept of inheritance that mirrors the functional extension of 
the principle of heritability to account for more (kinds of) phenotypic variation than 
before. Hence, the conceptual controversies on extended inheritance that I discussed 
above.
Within this context, niche construction theorists, in the same way as Merlin and 
Charbonneau, base their extended notion of inheritance on their interpretation of 
the principle of heritability. More specifically, their semantic extension of ‘inherit-
ance’—such that it encompasses also ecological inheritance—is motivated by their 
23 Charbonneau (2014) focuses on the case of diffused ecological inheritance as a mechanism that influ-
ences trait variation, rather than selective pressures, whereas Odling-Smee (2007) and Odling-Smee & 
Laland (2011) discuss niche inheritance as the interaction between genetic and ecological inheritance, 
where the latter is understood mainly as inheritance of selective pressures. These two understandings of 
ecological inheritance are not in contrast but, rather, complementary (Charbonneau, personal communi-
cation). For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to deal with the intricacies of this distinction.
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functional extension of the principle of heritability to model the variable of selective 
environment. As I discussed in Sect. 3.4, functional extension is preceded by a stage 
of quasi-axiomatisation, in which the principles become more abstract and idealised. 
This is the case also for the endogenization of selective environment. Niche construc-
tion theorists adopt a highly abstract version of the principle of heritability, so that it 
allows for the modelling of phenotypic traits that are not inherited via genetic inherit-
ance, thus abstracting away from parent–offspring lineages. Therefore, their seman-
tic extension of inheritance is not just motivated by their functional extension of the 
principle of heritability, but it is justified by their interpretation of its theoretical role.
In terms of coordination analysis, we can see how niche construction theorists 
defined a key component of the coordination between the functionally extended prin-
ciple of heritability and the domain of phenomena that it refers to—namely, their 
extended notion of inheritance—by holding fixed the epistemic function of an abstract 
theoretical principle in a novel empirical domain. However, their semantic extension 
of ‘inheritance’ is not guided only by theoretical considerations. As I discussed in 
Sect. 4.2, they identify causal factors that influence the retention of changes in vari-
ation distributions within and across generations. Therefore, their reconceptualiza-
tion of inheritance is based also on the recognition that the transmission and retention 
of traits via niche-construction activities were akin, in some relevant respect, to the 
transmission and retention of traits via reproduction. This is because this non-genetic 
form of transmission, cumulation and retention was causally responsible for a certain 
amount of phenotypic similarity that was excluded as such by previous theorising.
5  Conclusion
Controversies over the adequate semantic extension of the term ‘inheritance’ are still 
hotly debated. I have argued that these controversies should be viewed in connec-
tion with the functional extension of the principle of heritability, understood as a 
general epistemic precondition of the theory of evolution by natural selection. This 
extension, together with that of the principles of variation and differential fitness, is 
crucial to the process of endogenization of phenomena previously idealised away as 
background presuppositions of natural selection theory, such as the variable of the 
environment. As I showed above, different interpretations of the principle of herit-
ability prescribe different ways of working out the referential scope of ‘inheritance’ 
by including within it the physical transmission mechanisms that are thought to best 
fit both evidence and theory. In current discussions on the possibility of an extended 
evolutionary synthesis, different attitudes towards restricting or expanding the ref-
erential scope of ‘inheritance’ seem to reflect different modelling and explanatory 
purposes and, thus, may be subject to a pluralistic interpretation.
However, I have shown how the referential scope of ‘inheritance’ has been 
extended to include the mechanism of ecological inheritance in niche construction 
theory. This was achieved in the light both of the modelling purpose that resulted 
in the endogenization of selective environment, and of the identification of the 
relevant similarity, at the level of phenomena, between phenotypic variation due 
to genetic inheritance and phenotypic variation due to ecological inheritance as 
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ways of transmitting and retaining variation. I have argued that these two pieces 
of justification for the semantic extension of ‘inheritance’ by niche construction 
theorists represent a novel form of coordination between the level of theory, in 
this case the principle of heritability, and the level of phenomena, that here refers 
to the patterns of phenotypic variation that they aimed to model in evolutionary 
terms. In other words, niche construction theorists could develop their extended 
notion of ‘inheritance’—required in the light of their functional extension of the 
principles of natural selection to model selective environment—only by pro-
viding some form of justification for the extended representational relationship 
between these abstract theoretical principles underpinning their theory of refer-
ence and the concrete phenomena that they aimed to model, i.e., by providing a 
new form of coordination. Therefore, this novel coordination is preconditional 
to the semantic extension of inheritance and, thus, it is a crucial component of 
endogenization as a process of theory extension.
Clearly, the understanding of coordination that I have assumed in this analysis 
is not in terms of a single principle that provides a one-to-one mapping between a 
mathematically expressed theory or concept and a set of physical phenomena, as 
per Friedman’s view. Rather, coordination must be understood in a more flexible 
and ‘layered’ sense, especially in sciences beyond the physical ones, since several 
epistemic dimensions, such as those of measurement, modelling, and theorising 
are highly entangled when it comes to analysing the representational relationship 
between theory and phenomena.
In this paper, I have only focused on one key piece of the coordination between 
the theory of natural selection and empirical phenomena, that is, the concept of 
inheritance, and in a specific context of theory extension, namely, the endogeniza-
tion of selective environment. By discussing the relationship between the principle 
of heritability as an abstract theoretical precondition of natural selection, the con-
cept of inheritance, and the extended domain of phenotypic variation that niche con-
struction theorists aimed to model, I did not mean to offer a complete analysis of the 
coordination between neo-Darwinian theory or the extended evolutionary synthesis 
and empirical reality. Further work is certainly required to understand, for instance, 
the relationship between the epistemic elements considered above and different sta-
tistical measures of heritability, as well as its role in the general context of endogeni-
zation and in the endogenization of selective environment, more specifically. How-
ever, I have shown that the analysis of coordination, if suitably interpreted, gives 
us crucial insight on some epistemic and conceptual consequences of the strategy 
of endogenization in evolutionary biology that are not accounted for by Okasha’s 
own account. More generally, I have shown how developing Reichenbach’s original 
perspective of coordination into a more flexible and ‘layered’ notion can provide us 
with a systematic tool to analyse conceptual change even outside of the physical sci-
ences and in cases of theory extension.
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